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INTRODUCTION 
On October 1, 2011, California’s Criminal Justice 
Realignment Act became law.  It was designed to solve many 
of the State of California’s ills.1  Of primary concern was 
cutting costs for the budget-strapped state prison system.2  
Additionally, the State needed to reduce its prison population 
because the Supreme Court of the United States found that 
California’s prison overcrowding prevented adequate medical 
care for inmates and therefore violated the United States 
Constitution.3
The Realignment Act requires ongoing efforts to 
effectuate its intended purposes.
 
4  The Realignment strategy 
turns primarily on the location of the incarceration of certain 
inmates.5  Realignment also transfers substantial post-
conviction custodial and supervision responsibilities to the 
jurisdiction that sentenced the inmate, whereas in the past 
the State accepted all felon convicts into state prison.6  
Hypothetically, Realignment thereby realizes adequate cost 
savings and compliance with the order to reduce population.7
Data presented in this article will demonstrate that 
Realignment has not yet been implemented to its desired 
effect.
 
8  Data will also show that Realignment is being 
implemented inconsistently across the state.9
 
 1. BARRY KRISBERG & ELEANOR TAYLOR-NICHOLSON, REALIGNMENT: A 
BOLD NEW ERA IN CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 2 (Sept. 2011), available at  
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/REALIGNMENT_FINAL9.28.11.pdf. 
  While the 
reason for these deficiencies is not specifically known, this 
article explores how the habits and thought process of court 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1933 (2011), stay denied, 134 S. Ct. 1 
(2013). 
 4. The Legislature continued to enact provisions in “clean up” legislation 
since the original AB 109.  See, e.g., A.B. 117, 2011–2012 Sess. (2011). 
 5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h) (2011). 
 6. Fact Sheet, Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 2011 Public Safety 
Realignment (Dec. 19, 2013), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/ 
docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet.pdf [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See infra Figure 1 and associated text. 
 9. See infra Figure 2 and associated text. 
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officers are roadblocks to successful programmatic 
execution.10  These challenges emanate both from a thirty-
year period of cultural development regarding punishment 
and also from the role of parties in the criminal justice 
system.11
The first section of this article will explain Realignment, 
its history, and its purposes, including cost-savings and 
population reduction.  Data will show how the population of 
California’s prisons has changed in the past few years, thanks 
to Realignment.  Additionally, some important facets of 
Realignment will be introduced in this section, specifically 
post-release community supervision, split sentencing, and re-
entry services. 
  Much of the information and insight presented in 
this article on the plea bargaining and sentencing processes 
was obtained by the judge-author through his experience as a 
judicial officer and previously as a criminal defense attorney.  
The Honorable Philip H. Pennypacker has presided over 
criminal cases for ten years on the bench of the Superior 
Court of California, County of Santa Clara.  He was the 
supervising judge of the Criminal Division when the 
Realignment Act was passed.  Before that, he practiced 
criminal law for thirty-one years. 
The second section of this article will discuss plea 
bargaining, the vehicle through which most criminal 
convictions occur.  The plea bargaining process has some 
fundamental features that work against Realignment’s goals.  
Data will demonstrate the inconsistency with which split 
sentencing is implemented statewide, perhaps due to these 
inherent features. 
The topic of the third section is evidence-based 
sentencing practices, which is a relatively new philosophy 
that was included by the Legislature as a tenet of 
Realignment.  The practices are to be used by courts both in 
 
 10. See infra Parts III.A–III.B. 
 11. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 1004 (E.D. & N.D. 
Cal. 2009). 
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initial sentencings and in revocation hearings for any form 
post-conviction supervision (commonly thought of as parole 
and probation).12  Transitioning to new principals may be 
difficult to both bench officers and attorneys involved in the 
system.13  Similar to the situation with plea bargaining, the 
pre-existing sentencing culture is somewhat incompatible 
with the use of evidence-based practices.14
In the fourth section, the authors review the above-
mentioned challenges in the specific context of supervision 
revocation. 
 
Finally, the paper offers suggestions and conclusions 
regarding how and whether the State can reach the goals 
established in conjunction with Realignment. 
I. THE HISTORY BEHIND REALIGNMENT 
The impetus for enacting the Criminal Justice 
Realignment Act of 2011 boils down to two concurrent 
problems facing the State, both the result of significant prison 
overcrowding.  California’s thirty-three in-state, adult prison 
facilities were designed to accommodate approximately 
80,000 individuals.15  By 2006, the population in these thirty-
three facilities had grown to 163,500 inmates, an astonishing 
202% of design capacity.16
Economics and constitutional concerns required 
California to reduce its prison population.  The massive 
prison overcrowding put significant strain on California’s 
budget, forcing the Governor’s Office and the Legislature to 
take action.
 
17
 
 12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(4). 
  Both branches recognized that with the 
reduction of prison population, a natural diminution of 
 13. See infra Part III.A. 
 14. See infra Part III.C. 
 15. Court-Ordered Targets for CDCR Inmate Population Reduction, CAL. 
DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/3jp-chart.html 
[hereinafter Court-Ordered Targets]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 912 (this opinion combines the separately 
brought actions of Coleman v. Brown and Plata v. Brown). 
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economic support would follow. Simultaneously, pending 
federal cases against the State regarding its prison system 
had taken on gargantuan proportions.18
A. The Federal Cases 
  To resolve both 
issues at the same time, the California Legislature passed the 
Realignment Act. 
Initially, two separate cases were filed in federal court in 
Sacramento challenging conditions in the California State 
Prison System.19  The first case, Coleman v. Brown, was filed 
in 1990 and challenged the treatment of prisoners with 
mental disorders.20  A second case, Plata v. Brown, filed in 
2001, concerned the availability of adequate medical care.21  
Common between both cases were independent reviews 
pointing to the fact that overcrowding caused increased 
chances of infection and other health problems, and 
exacerbated issues of the mentally ill.22  Overcrowding 
strained the attention health care professionals could give to 
people in need.23  When left to neglect, all conditions 
worsened.24  Each case went along on its own for several 
years until the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit consolidated 
Coleman and Plata so that three-judge panel could commence 
a hearing and manage the oversight of orders to remediate 
the overcrowding.25
In their briefs for the consolidated case, the plaintiffs 
argued that harmful overcrowding conditions violated the 
Constitution’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  The plaintiffs presented overwhelming evidence 
that overcrowding was causing avoidable medical and mental 
 
 
 18. Id. at 888. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 897–98. 
 21. Id. at 890–92 (describing the claim brought by plaintiffs in Plata v. 
Brown). 
 22. See id. at 887, 909. 
 23. Id. at 909. 
 24. Id. at 895. 
 25. Coleman v. Brown, 922 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (E.D. Cal. 2013). 
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health issues.26  The judges agreed and found that the system 
was on the verge of collapse or implosion.27  Because of the 
overcrowding, systematic institutional incompetence 
prevailed in the attention to both medical and mental health 
issues.28  Solutions implemented while the cases were 
pending were inadequate due to the flood of prisoners coming 
into the system, and the miniscule flow of those leaving.29  
Those solutions included building new health facilities that 
directly addressed medical and mental health issues, as well 
as placing inmates out of state.30
Ultimately, the three-judge panel ordered the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to 
reduce the population of its thirty-three prison facilities to 
110,000 inmates (still 137.5% of design capacity) by June 27, 
2013.
 
31  This level of reduction required the State to disgorge 
between 38,000 and 46,000 prisoners or face contempt.  No 
direction was imposed on the state on how to meet this goal; 
rather, the court deferred to the State’s best judgment.32
The consolidated cases eventually found their way to the 
Supreme Court of the United States under the name Brown v. 
Plata, where Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, took on two difficult issues.
 
33  The first was the 
reach of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995.34  This act 
was designed to truncate prison litigation stemming from any 
prison housing condition.35
 
 26. Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 950. 
  Under the act, findings regarding 
the systematic nature of the alleged violations are necessary, 
and rulings must meet the “clear and convincing” evidence 
 27. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1927–28. 
 28. See Coleman, 922 F. Supp. 2d at 963. 
 29. Id. at 914–16. 
 30. Id. at 903–04, 958–59. 
 31. Id. at 1003. 
 32. Id. at 1003–04. 
 33. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910. 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1997). 
 35. See William C. Collins, Bumps in the Road to the Courthouse: The 
Supreme Court and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 24 PACE L. REV. 651, 667 
(2004). 
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standard.36  Further, the Act requires that intermediate steps 
should be explored and tried before an order as drastic as 
reduction is entered.  After receiving fourteen days of expert 
testimony, reports from receivers and monitors, and actual 
case histories, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment of 
the Constitution barring cruel and unusual punishment was 
an important ingredient in evaluating the claims under this 
Act.37
The second issue was the order of the three-judge court, 
which Justice Kennedy affirmed with little difficulty since the 
lower court’s record was replete with instances of failed 
medical attention, suicides, and squalid, unlivable 
conditions.
 
38  Justice Kennedy’s opinion is stocked with 
examples, pictures, and anecdotal information proven at the 
trial court level.39  Thus, the burden of fashioning a remedy 
fell back on the shoulders of the State.40
B. The Economic Status of the State of California 
 
While the federal cases were pending, California was on 
the verge of an economic meltdown, much like the rest of the 
country.41  Income to the State of California had fallen, 
services were in question, and the structure of the State’s 
financial well-being was in doubt.42  Furthermore, even 
without an economic crisis, the costs of incarceration were 
and still are staggering.43  Each prisoner costs the state of 
California, on average, $45,006 per year.44
 
 36. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929; 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E). 
  Reducing the 
 37. Plata, 131 S. Ct  at 1929. 
 38. Id. at 1949.   
 39. Id. at 1935, 1949–50. 
 40. Id. at 1947. 
 41. Taylor Chase-Wagniere, Note, The Perfect Storm: Brown v. Plata and 
California’s Financial Crisis, 22 CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 345, 358–59 (2013). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. at 359. 
 44. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLANCE 10 
(Fall 2011), available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011_ 
Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf.  This figure has been adjusted upward based on 
information from the Department of Finance.  Joan Petersilia, Voices from the 
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population by 40,000 inmates (per the above-mentioned court 
order) thus saves the state upwards of $1.8 billion annually.  
Additionally, the Legislature had attempted an intermediate 
solution of stemming the flow of new prisoners by way of 
offering subvention monies to the counties in SB 678, and the 
report generated by the Administrative Office of the Courts 
indicated that the costs of incarceration had gone up 300% 
since 1990-2012.  Leaving aside the costs of education and 
other comparative services, the taxpayers have not been 
getting a value-added return on their tax dollar investment.45
The fiscal condition of the State did not go unnoticed in 
the federal cases.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy noted in his 
opinion:   
 
“The court cannot ignore the political and fiscal reality 
behind this case.  California’s Legislature has not been 
willing or able to allocate the resources necessary to meet 
this crisis absent a reduction in overcrowding.  There is 
not reason to believe it will begin to do so now, when the 
State of California is facing an unprecedented budgetary 
shortfall.”46
California’s longstanding aggressive incarceration policy 
only exacerbated the budget problem.  In the thirty years 
preceding these cases, the State of California built an 
unprecedented number of prisons to keep pace with a growing 
inmate population, spurred by Legislative enactments which 
required the placement of people in prison with no 
consideration for probation.
 
47
 
Field: How California Stakeholders View Criminal Justice Realignment 41 
(Stanford Crim. Just. Ctr., Working Paper 2013), available at http://www.law. 
stanford.edu/publications/voices-from-the-field-how-california-stakeholders-
view-public-safety-realignment. 
  Moreover, various initiatives 
had been passed by the voters which increased prison 
 45. See generally CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANY, THE PRICE OF 
PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS (2012), available at http:// 
www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Price_of_Prisons_updated_
version_072512.pdf. 
 46. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939. 
 47. Andrew M. Ducart, Go Directly to Jail: How Misaligned Subsidies 
Undermine California’s Prisoner Realignment Goal and What is Possible to 
Maximize the Law’s Potential, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 481, 486–87 (2013). 
PENNYPACKER FINAL 4/18/2014  7:05 PM 
2013] THE REALIGNMENT ACT 999 
sentences, such at the “Three Strikes and You Are Out” law, 
which carried a minimum sentence on the Third Strike of 
twenty-five years to life, even for a new, non-violent, non-
serious offense.48
Furthermore, as noted in the Plata decision, once 
released, the parole agents were in a process of incarcerating 
a high number of parole violators, which in turn, cost the 
state money either to house the person in prison, or on 
separate, very expensive contracts with local county jails.
 
49  
For example, contracts with both Sacramento and Alameda 
counties were in excess of $15 million per year.50  Prisoners 
returned on parole violations had very few services to provide 
a safety net to them, and because of their cultural, 
institutional, and criminal outlook, few had an incentive to 
become involved in any services offered by the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.51
C. The Initial Experiment: S.B. 678 
 
While the litigation in Plata was pending, the Legislature 
enacted Senate Bill (S.B.) 678 otherwise known as the 
California Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009.52  
The goal of this legislation was to reduce prison population 
and save money in the State’s General Fund.53  Without 
compromising public safety, incentives (in the form of 
economic assistance to the counties) were to be passed on to 
counties who had shown a reduction in the number of state 
prison commitments from a base year.54  The specific target 
was to reduce the number of persons committed to prison for 
probation violations.55
 
 48. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)–(i), 1170.12.  
  Funds secured from S.B. 678 went to 
 49. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 50. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 95–96. 
 51. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943, 1954. 
 52. California Corrections Performance Incentives Act of 2009, S.B. 678, 
2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
PENNYPACKER FINAL 4/18/2014  7:05 PM 
1000 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
hiring more probation officers to more closely monitor clients, 
securing of risk/needs assessment instruments, contracting 
for cognitive behavior therapy programs, and training on the 
new methods to be utilized in the system.56
County-level probation departments were to adopt and 
implement programs, derived from evidence-based practices, 
which assessed individuals in terms of “risks” and “needs” 
and placed them in programs accordingly with the end goal of 
reducing both prison commitments and recidivism.
 
57  
Evidence-based practices, which will be explained more 
thoroughly in the third section of this article, are defined 
statutorily as “supervision policies, procedures, programs, 
and practices demonstrated by scientific research to reduce 
recidivism among individuals under probation, parole or post-
release supervision.”58
In a report issued in April 2013, the Administrative 
Office of the Courts noted both successes and failures of this 
Act.
 
59  It noted that the first three-year cycle of the program 
saved the State approximately $500,000,000.60  Counties 
received approximately $130,000,000 in re-investment 
money.61  The report did note, however, that not all of the 
probation departments had enacted evidence-based 
practices.62  Further, the amount of money needed to fully 
implement the process was lacking in certain areas.63
In 2009, this was a bold experiment advanced by persons 
who had studied this area of corrections and public policy.
 
64
 
 56. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA 
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES ACT OF 2009 16 (2013), 
available at http://www.bscc.ca.gov/download.php?f=/AOC_SB-678-April-
2013.pdf [hereinafter REPORT]. 
  
 57. Id. 
 58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1229(d). 
 59. See generally REPORT, supra note 56. 
 60. Id. at 1. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 14. 
 63. Id. at 38. 
 64. Jessica Feinstein, Reforming Adult Felony Probation to Ease Prison 
Overcrowding: An Overview of S.B. 678, 14 CHAP. L. REV. 375, 396 (2011). 
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The stark financial issues facing continued growth of a prison 
population were not lost on the drafters of this legislation.65  
The most shocking figure was that during the twenty-year 
period, from 1991 to the date of enactment, the original 
prison budget of $9.8 billion and had grown at a rate of 
300%.66 Such drastic inflation of the budget required serious 
innovation on behalf of the legislators.67
D. Stage Set for the Criminal Realignment Act 
 
With the fiscal crisis and federal cases coming to a head, 
and a functional but inadequate preliminary solution in S.B. 
678, the Legislature drafted the Criminal Realignment Act as 
a grand scheme to solve many problems and provide overall 
improvement the state system of incarceration. 
II. WHAT IS REALIGNMENT? 
The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 created a 
number of structural changes to the face of the criminal 
justice system, yet the act was passed with little formal input 
from criminal justice participants.68  The Legislature provided 
adequate time for local agencies to prepare for the changes 
associated with Realignment.69  Unfortunately, the 
Realignment Act has failed thus far to reduce prison 
population sufficiently to comply with the court order.70
A. The Structure of Realignment 
 
The Legislature expressed the overarching principals of 
Realignment via findings in California Penal Code sections 
 
 65. Id. at 397–98. 
 66. Id. at 397. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Steven Thomas Fazzi, A Primer on the 2011 Correction Realignment: 
Why California Placed Felons under County Control, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 423, 
427–28 (2013); Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, 
Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 184 (2013) (noting 
that the only parties excluded from meetings regarding the Act were prisoners 
and prisoner advocates). 
 69. Stats. 2011, c. 15. 
 70. See Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 1. 
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17.5 and 3450.  An overview of those findings is critical to 
understanding of the direction of the Act.  In these findings, 
the Legislature recommitted itself to reducing recidivism and 
protecting public safety.71  The Legislature found that 
building more prisons has not guaranteed a safer state.72  
Also, the Legislature highlighted “low-level” felony offenders 
for housing in the county of their conviction.73  Furthermore, 
the Legislature agreed to “reinvest” in counties for their 
commitment to the program.74  The Legislature likewise 
required the establishment of a Community Corrections 
Partnership in each county to oversee and structurally 
implement the goals of Realignment locally.75  Finally, the 
Legislature required the use of evidence-based practices in 
furthering the reintegration of the convicted felons back into 
society.76
1. Accumulation of Legislation 
  Thus, the Realignment Act encompassed several 
important features which each deserve their own discussion. 
Firstly, after the Act was passed it was vetted by 
criminal justice practitioners and was found to have several 
drafting problems.77  Those were addressed immediately with 
emergency legislation passed by the Legislature (AB 116, AB 
117, ABX 117, and SB 1023).78  This “clean-up” legislation 
made the Act more understandable and internally 
consistent.79
 
 71. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(1). 
 
 72. Id. § 17.5(a)(3). 
 73. Id. § 17.5(a)(5). 
 74. Id. § 17.5(a)(7). 
 75. Id. §§ 17.5(a)(6), 1230(b)(2). 
 76. Id. §§ 17.5(a)(5), 3450. 
 77. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 15.  
 78. Id. at 36. 
 79. For example, the original legislation omitted the method and procedure 
for the revocation of mandatory supervision.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(B).  
The “clean up” legislation remedied this, and was resolved ultimately in S.B. 
1023.  S.B. 1023, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
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2. Local Custody for Low-Level Offenders 
The Realignment Act ordered “low level” felony offenders 
to be housed locally by counties, as opposed to traditionally 
sending the offenders to state prison at the State’s expense.80  
Realignment excluded from its reach three groups of inmates: 
(1) persons with a present or prior conviction of a violent or 
serious offenses (Penal Code Sections 667.5(c) and 1192.7(c)); 
(2) persons subject to offenses—either presently or in the 
past—where registration under Penal Code Section 290 was 
required (commonly known as “sex offender registration”); 
and (3) persons who have committed aggravated white collar 
offenses under Penal Code Section 186.11.81  Under 
Realignment, these three groups of persons still serve their 
sentence in State prison.82
However, approximately 500 felony offenses exist outside 
the three groups listed above, and have been deemed to be 
within the scope of “low-level” offenders.
 
83  Most of the low-
level offenses have a potential sentence of sixteen months, 
two years, or three years in state prison.84  There are some 
deviations to that scheme, but by and large, this is the group 
targeted by the Legislature.85  These low-level offenders 
historically served their time in state prison, but Realignment 
transferred the burden of their care and incarceration back to 
the county where they were sentenced.86  The burden is 
significant, and the State’s original projections placed an 
additional 25,469 inmates plus 29,549 post-release 
community supervisees on counties statewide.87
 
 80. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17.5(a)(5). 
  Under 
 81. Id. §§ 17.5(a)(5), 1170(h)(3). 
 82. Id. § 1170(h)(3). 
 83. J. RICHARD COUZENS, FELONY SENTENCING AFTER REALIGNMENT 94 
(2013), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/felony_ 
sentencing.pdf. 
 84. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(1). 
 85. For example, a crime in furtherance of a street gang is not automatically 
a state prison offense.  Id. § 182.5. 
 86. Fact Sheet, supra note 6, at 1. 
 87. Funding and Projected Inmate Caseload, CALREALIGNMENT.ORG (2012), 
http://calrealignment.org/county-implementation.html. 
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California law, there is a status enhancement carrying a one- 
year consecutive sentence for any person who had served a 
prior prison term.  The Realignment Act modified this 
provision so that serving time for one of these 500 felony 
offenses in a local jail still counts as a “prison prior” for 
purposes of a one-year status enhancement under California 
Penal Code section 667.5(b)(1) on future convictions.88
3. Split Sentencing 
  In 
short, the Realignment Act changed the location where the 
sentence is served, but not the ultimate stigma of the offense. 
One of the innovative features of Realignment gives the 
sentencing court discretion in determining how the sentence 
is served.89  Penal Code Sections 1170(h)(5)(A) and 
1170(h)(5)(B) permit a low-level sentence to be served in one 
of two fashions.  The first option is to commit the person to 
the county jail for the entire term of the sentence.90  If that is 
done, Realignment provides no period of parole after the 
service of the term (contrary to the pre-Realignment 
system).91  The second option is to “split” or “blend” the 
sentence, so that part of the time is served in custody, and 
part of the time is a period of “mandatory supervision” which 
has conditions similar to a probation sentence and is 
administered by the local probation office.92
Split sentencing is valuable because it allows probation 
to connect early with individuals in the system.
 
93  Instead of 
sitting in jail, people on supervision receive case management 
services to help them re-enter the community with a greater 
chance of success (maintaining public safety and reducing 
recidivism).94
 
 88. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(d). 
 
 89. Id. § 1170(h)(5)(A)–(B). 
 90. Id. § 1170(h)(5)(A). 
 91. COUZENS, supra note 83, at 10. 
 92. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h)(5)(B). 
 93. COUZENS, supra note 83, at 11. 
 94. Ducart, supra note 47, at 493. 
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Despite the benefits of split sentencing, the data does not 
demonstrate sufficient employment of this new sentencing 
opportunity.  Of all the felony sentences pronounced since 
Realignment’s inception, approximately fifty percent of them 
were served locally and therefore also eligible to be split 
between custody and mandatory supervision95 (See Figure 1, 
below).  However, of all of those felony sentences served 
locally, as of June 2012, only 26% of them (statewide) were 
split to include mandatory supervision.96  Application of split 
sentencing is erratic at best. (See Figure 2).  For example, 
eligible sentences in Stanislaus County are split 86% of the 
time97 whereas eligible sentences in Los Angeles County98 are 
split only 6% of the time.99  Unfortunately, a slow rate of 
adoption appears to be the norm; of California’s fifty-eight 
counties, only approximately sixteen maintain more than fifty 
individuals on mandatory supervision at any given time.100
 
 95. MIKE MALES, ONE YEAR INTO REALIGNMENT: PROGRESS STALLS, 
STRONGER INCENTIVES NEEDED 2 (2012), available at 
http://www.cjcj.org/news/5997; Split Sentencing Dashboard, CHIEF PROB. 
OFFICERS OF CAL. (2012), 
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/splitsentencedashboard.swf  
[hereinafter Split Sentencing Dashboard]. 
 
 96. Split Sentencing Dashboard, supra note 95. 
 97. However, Stanislaus County sends more offenders per capita to prison 
than the state average and sends more nonviolent offenders to prison than most 
other counties; 60% of the inmates it sends to prison are nonviolent, suggesting 
that the remaining convicts left in their custody are lower-level offenders than 
in other counties.  MALES, supra note 95; Split Sentencing Dashboard, supra 
note 95. 
 98. Split Sentencing Dashboard, supra note 95. 
 99. In fact, in June 2012, Los Angeles County had only eighteen people 
actively on Mandatory Supervision.  Id. 
 100. County Realignment Dashboard, CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS OF CAL. (2013), 
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/dashboard_county.swf. 
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Figure 1101
 
 
 
 
 101. MALES, supra note 95; Realignment Dashboard, CHIEF PROB. OFFICERS 
OF CAL. (2013), http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/dashboard.swf 
[hereinafter Realignment Dashboard]. 
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Figure 2102
4. Post-Release Community Supervision (PRCS) and 
Parole 
 
The Realignment Act also restructured the entire concept 
of parole.  There were several significant changes. First, those 
serving time for low-level offenses, who were or would be 
released from a prison sentence on the date of the Act’s 
inception, were then and are now placed on post-release 
community supervision (PRCS) instead of parole.103  PRCS 
and parole are similar in the way that they are both 
supervised, out-of-custody agreements with requirements and 
restrictions on the released person.104  However, PRCS is 
administered through the local probation departments 
whereas parole is administered by the State by the 
Department of Parole Administration.105
 
 102. Split Sentencing Dashboard, supra note 95. 
  Any revocation of 
 103. COUZENS, supra note 83, at 56. 
 104. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3541. 
 105. Post-Release (County Level) Supervision, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. 
(2013), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/Post-Release-Community-
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this status was to be handled by the Superior Courts.106
Second, as a delayed aspect of Realignment, on July 1, 
2013, the entire parole revocation process shifted from a State 
administrative agency to the local Superior Courts.
  
107  Several 
classes of individuals remained subject to parole supervision.  
These persons were ones who had been convicted of a violent 
or serious offense, a three-strike offense, a special category of 
sex offender and the Mentally Disordered Offenders.108
Accordingly, the processes of revocation for paroled and 
PRCS individuals are new areas for local court systems.  The 
resulting added caseload for counties is significant. In the 
first year following Realignment, the state released 36,329 
individuals on PCRS.
   
109  Sixty-four percent have been able to 
complete PRCS successfully with no returns to custody, 
meaning that approximately one in three individuals on 
PRCS will violate their terms and need to be dealt with by 
counties.110  Additionally, approximately ten percent of 
individuals on PRCS so far have warrants for failure to 
appear.111
The impact of the new caseloads on the superior courts, 
probation departments and jails is significant.  Superior 
courts had to appoint hearing officers to adjudicate the 
revocations.
 
112
 
Supervision.html. 
 Calendars and staffing for the calendars had to 
be accomplished.  Coordination with the county jails had to be 
maintained.  Protocols for the delivery of the petitions had to 
be approved between the agencies.  Probation had to hire, 
train, and establish new units designed to manage “high risk” 
offenders.  Parole divisions within the state had to gear up to 
do hearings in a courtroom setting rather than by 
 106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3450 et seq. 
 107. Id. § 3000.08. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Realignment Dashboard, supra note 101. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. CAL. GOV. CODE § 71622.5. 
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administrative hearings.  County jails had to experience and 
still experience an expansion of the capacities in the local 
jurisdictions. 
5. Evidence-Based Practices 
According to the mandate of the Realignment Act, 
evidence-based practices are essential to, and required in, the 
sentencing and supervision revocation processes.113  An entire 
subsequent section of this article is dedicated to explaining, in 
a summary fashion, evidence-based practices.  However, to 
think about them simply, consider that judges, lawyers, and 
probation departments take into account many more facts 
and assumptions about a defendant during the sentencing 
process in order to decide the appropriate sentence (and also 
whether to subsequently revoke parole or PRCS).  Evidence-
based practices are a new approach to gathering and 
analyzing this information, backed by research, with the 
promise of better results so that more fitting outcomes can be 
guaranteed.114  Sentences produced through this method are 
more individualized, which is valuable because research has 
shown that the nature of the defendant makes a difference as 
to whether a particular sentence will help a convicted person 
reform and recover or actually make him worse.115
6. Custody Credits 
 
Finally, the entire method of awarding custody credits, 
both at the county jail and state prison level was changed.116
 
 113. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17.5(a)(5), 3450(b)(8). 
  
Certain violent offenders are not subject to this process under 
California Penal Code Section 2933.1.  Those offenders 
 114. Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta-analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender 
Recidivism: What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 575 (1996). 
 115. Id. at 575, 588, 591. 
 116. The California Penal Code awards actual custody day toward the 
ultimate sentence.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 2900.5.  The Legislature has tinkered 
with California Penal Code section 4019 for years. This section provides that the 
inmate “earns” “good time-work time” in excess of the actual days spent in 
custody.   
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receive only a fifteen percent reduction of their sentences for 
“good time-work time”.117  However, most offenders now 
receive credits that translate to the following: for every two 
days served, the offender receives an additional two days of 
credit.118  For example, if a low level offender has actually 
been in custody for ten days, he has earned twenty days of 
credit toward his sentence.  This method of advancing credits 
was addressed in the Plata decision and was made a part of 
the Realignment Act in order to reduce overcrowding.119
B. Population Reduction Data 
 
Realignment has been in motion for two years as of the 
writing of this article.  While significant changes to the 
criminal justice system are visible, Realignment has not yet 
attained its goals.120
Even before the Act became law, counties anticipatorily 
modified their sentencing practices and reduced the number 
of convicts they sent to prison.
 
121  Then, in the first eight 
months after Realignment, the prison population decreased 
steadily.122  Between October 2011 and March 2012, felony 
commitments to state prison dropped 41% as all counties 
implemented the new practices.123  Prison commitments 
dropped by 66% for females and 38% for males.124
 
 117. Id. § 2933.1. 
  Offenders 
between the ages of 35 and 39 were 50% less likely to be sent 
 118. Id. § 4019. 
 119. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 120. California failed to sufficiently reduce its prison population by the June 
2013 deadline.  See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F. Supp. 2d 882, 949 (E.D. 
& N.D. Cal. 2009).  Furthermore, it is too early to measure recidivism, which is 
generally analyzed in a three-year term. 
 121. Ducart, supra note 47, at 506–07. 
 122. Monthly Population Report Archive, CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB. 
(2011 & 2012), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_ 
Services_Branch/Monthly/Monthly_Tpop1a_Archive.html [hereinafter Monthly 
Population Reports]. 
 123. MIKE MALES, UPDATE: EIGHT MONTHS INTO REALIGNMENT: DRAMATIC 
REDUCTIONS IN CALIFORNIA PRISONERS 1 (2012),http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports 
/docs/External-Reports/Realignment_update_June_19_2012.pdf  [hereinafter 
MALES, UPDATE]. 
 124. Id. at 2. 
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to prison.125  Prison commitments for property and drug 
crimes dropped 60% and 70% respectively.126  Six months 
after Realignment began, seven major California counties had 
reduced their prison commitments by 50% or more.127
 
 
 
Figure 3128
 
 
As of July 31, 2013, the population in the thirty-three 
state prison facilities of concern was 119,624.129  See Figure 3.  
Despite a promising start, the state failed to comply with the 
June 2013 population target of 110,000.130  The problem 
began with an unexplainable population plateau in July 
2012.131
 
 125. Id. at 4. 
  New felon admissions increased at that point 
 126. Id.  
 127. Counties: Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Kings, Tulare, San Mateo, 
Ventura, and San Bernardino.  Id. at 5–6. 
 128. Monthly Population Reports, supra note 122. 
 129. Court-Ordered Targets, supra note 15. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
PENNYPACKER FINAL 4/18/2014  7:05 PM 
1012 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
roughly 3%.132  Sentences for simple possession of drugs 
(other than marijuana), motor vehicle theft, and burglary 
were suddenly and mysteriously more frequent, and 
primarily responsible for the increase.133  The increase was 
concentrated in three large counties: Sacramento, San 
Bernardino, and Kings, which were responsible for half of the 
growth.134  As of yet, there is no known reason for the 
increase.  However, the net result is that after nearly two 
years of the Realignment Act, prison commitments have 
fallen only 36%.135
III. APPLICATION OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES 
 
A primary challenge in the implementation of the 
Realignment Act is the requirement that courts and 
probation departments utilize evidence-based practices in the 
sentencing of low-level offenders.136  The challenge derives in 
large part from the fact that evidence-based practices are a 
new method of addressing sentencing, the application of 
which requires some training and re-learning by the 
professionals involved.137
A. What are Evidence-Based Practices? 
 
When a defendant is sentenced, and when a decision 
needs to be made on whether to revoke the defendant’s 
supervision, the courts and probation departments use what 
they know about the defendant to arrive at what seems to be 
the most appropriate outcome.138
 
 132. MALES, UPDATE, supra note 123, at 3–5. 
  Until recently, the 
traditional analysis used to make these decisions was 
 133. Id. at 4. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 2. 
 136. Ducart, supra note 47, at 506; Roger K. Warren, Evidence-based 
Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-based Practice to State 
Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 585, 628 (2009). 
 137. Ducart, supra note 47, at 509–12 (discussing the need to identify the 
appropriate factors for a given type of offender and the accurate weight 
assigned to said factor for a particular community). 
 138. Feinstein, supra note 64, at 402; Warren, supra note 136, at 627. 
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untested and unproven.139
Evidence-based practices are the result of research 
demonstrating that the best methods of analysis for 
determining the most fitting outcome for a particular convict 
consider both the nature and needs of the specific defendant, 
and the requirement for public safety.
 
140  The result is a more 
individualized sentence than what occurred previously, and 
one in which the defendant has a better chance of successful 
treatment, if amenable.141
Evidence-based practices give structure to sentencing 
and revocation decisions by assessing defendants in three 
primary areas: (1) risk of reoffending; (2) prognostic risks, 
which are risks that predict a poorer outcome for a specific 
defendant in a standard rehabilitation program; and (3) 
criminogenic needs, which refer to clinical disorders and 
functional impairments of the defendant that should be 
addressed to reduce the risk of further offending.
 
142  Once 
these factors are assessed, most offenders can be categorized 
into one of four groups: High Risk / High Needs, High Risk / 
Low Needs, Low Risk / High Needs, or Low Risk / Low 
Needs.143  Each category has specific modalities of treatments 
to be applied, some of which are completely counter-intuitive 
to the analysis previously employed by courts.144
 
 139. See Ducart, supra note 47, at 509–12. 
  For 
example, a Low Risk / Low Needs offender may be a casual 
abuser of substances, not an addict, and have no prior record.  
Under the pre-existing system, this person would be ordered 
to complete an intense drug treatment program, simply 
 140. Warren, supra note 136, at 598, 622–23. 
 141. Joan Petersilia, California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and 
Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 270–71 (2008). 
 142. Douglas Marlowe, Evidence Based Analysis for Drug Offenders: An 
Analysis of Prognostic Risks and Criminogenic Needs, 1 CHAPMAN J. CRIM. 
JUST. 167, 179–81 (2009). 
 143. Id. at 184–200. 
 144. Id. at 199.  Research shows that low risk, low need offenders may 
respond most effectively to the threat of severe punishment because they are 
not familiar with punishment and will work to prevent this outcome.  Id. 
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because that is what the courts were used to doing, had done 
in the past, and—without further education—would continue 
to do in the future.145  According to evidence-based practices 
she would not do well in a residential treatment program 
because she would be exposed to heavy users or addicts, who 
tend to have influence over casual users.146
Much of the research behind evidence-based practices 
stems from studies done on persons involved with substance 
abuse.
 
147  Over the past two decades, drug courts, diversion 
programs, and other methods of addressing the specific needs 
of drug abusers have been established nationwide, providing 
abundant relevant data from which helpful conclusions were 
drawn.148  Since at least 80% of incarcerated persons have 
substance abuse issues that generally go unaddressed, data 
regarding the apposite resources for drug abusers is an 
appropriate baseline for research on criminal sentencing in 
general.149
B. Why are Evidence-Based Practices Critical to Realignment? 
   
A profound and meaningful amount of research has gone 
into studying this methodology.150  What comes through 
clearly from the scientific research is that when the 
assessment is correctly done, and the programmatic steps are 
taken, both public safety and reduced recidivism are 
realized.151
 
 145. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
  Many offenders sentenced under traditional 
 146. Marlowe, supra note 142, at 198–99. 
 147. Id. at 198–200. 
 148. See generally Richard S. Gebelein, Delaware Leads the Nation: 
Rehabilitation in a Law and Order Society; A System Responds to Punitive 
Rhetoric, 7 DEL. L. REV. 1, 1–22 (2004) (discussing the rise in drug offender 
focused programs despite rhetoric suggesting no support for rehabilitation).  See 
also Marlowe, supra note 142, at 170–76. 
 149. Marlowe, supra note 142, at 167, 168 n.4. 
 150. For example, visit the California Courts’ website, which features a 
variety of studies and practice guides on the topic of evidence-based practices as 
applied to the criminal justice system.  Evidence-Based Practice, CAL. COURTS, 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/5285.htm. 
 151.  PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, RISK/NEEDS ASSESSMENT 101: SCIENCE 
REVEALS NEW TOOLS TO MANAGE OFFENDERS 4 (Sept. 2011), available at 
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models are caught in the revolving door of the criminal justice 
system.  Evidence-based practices seek to discover the source 
of the offender’s behavior, and through cognitive behavior 
treatment, address the issue so that the offender has less of a 
probability to return to the system.152
However, for evidence-base practices to be successful, a 
commitment is required from all partners in the criminal 
justice system (including police departments, probation 
departments, social services, judges, and lawyers).
  While safety and 
reduction of recidivism are at the heart of the Realignment 
Act, perhaps an even more appealing benefit is that the 
overall financial costs to the entire criminal justice system 
are reduced because resources can now be more strategically 
applied. 
153  
Furthermore, the evidence-based thought process must start 
at arrest and be maintained through the completion of post-
incarceration release.154
C. Intricacies and Challenges of Implementing Evidence-
Based Practices 
  The old, cookie-cutter method of 
sentencing must be replaced by individualized sentencing. 
Several aspects of the evidence-based practices method 
prove a difficult adjustment for persons well settled in the old 
ways.155  First, the language used in the entire assessment 
process is foreign and, in some cases, counter-intuitive to 
many participants in the criminal justice system, including 
judges in particular.  For example, a person with numerous 
substance abuse arrests and mental health issues may be 
assessed into the “High Risk” category.156
 
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2011/Pew_Risk_Assessme
nt_brief.pdf. 
  A judicial officer 
would not instinctively place a “High Risk” offender on 
 152. Id. at 3. 
 153. Id. at 5. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Marlowe, supra note 142, at 184.  
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probation or mandatory supervision because of the negative 
and serious public safety connotation of the label.  Yet, the 
evidence-based practices demonstrate such supervision may 
be the best solution.157
Second, judicial reluctance to enter into this method of 
sentencing is apparent.  As recognized by Judge Michael 
Marcus of Oregon, many judges believe that defendants 
coming into their courts should be punished—“just deserts”
  Therefore, the process of educating 
and training judicial officers on the language used by the 
system is essential. 
158 
meted out and court processes closed—and what follows later 
is between the defendant and the post-conviction supervision 
authority.159  Such separation is now proven to be 
disadvantageous.160  Instead, research shows that many 
offenders require some form of judicial intervention as a part 
of the rehabilitation program.161  Periodic reviews, status 
reports and instant incarceration are needed in some of the 
quadrants.162
Third, there is institutional bias against the application 
of evidence-based practices.
  Accordingly, the resistance to continued 
judicial involvement must be overcome. 
163  This bias is not localized to 
any one part of the criminal justice system, and extends to 
judges and attorneys.  It is easy to see evidence-based 
practices as a scheme that coddles criminals, and prosecutors, 
by and large, have little, if any, interest in a system that is 
known for such a thing.164
 
 157. Id. at 185. 
  Prosecutors may be more 
concerned about evenly outcomes among similarly charged 
 158. Judge Michael Marcus, Conversations on Evidence-Based Sentencing, 1 
CHAPMAN J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 95–98 (2009).  “Just deserts” describes a reason for 
increasing a sentence simply because of the need to do so and without 
cognizance of the individualized needs of a defendant, the cost of incarceration, 
and lack of reality as to what will happen thereafter. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 184. 
 163. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 9. 
 164. Id. at 131–32. 
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defendants, than trying to individualize outcomes, which 
would be more consistent with evidence-based practices.165  
This type of “cookie cutter” plea bargaining runs counter to 
the need to assess and implement a rehabilitative program 
consistent with the assessment.  Defense attorneys resist the 
system because its cornerstone is garnering as much reliable 
and validated information from the defendant as possible at 
an early stage of the proceedings.166  Such disclosure of 
personal information is counter to the adversarial nature of 
the work done by defense attorneys; very few would ever 
allow clients to freely, openly, and truthfully discuss details of 
drug abuse, social circles, and family situations.167  This type 
of information is critical in the assessment process but 
normally would be stymied, absent a protective order.168
Finally, the duration of sentences typical of the low-level 
offenders targeted by Realignment is not entirely compatible 
with what evidence-based practices proscribe for successful 
treatment.  For example, consider the following hypothetical: 
a defendant is charged with possession of methamphetamine 
under section 11377a of the California Health and Safety 
Code, and has three prison priors.  The greatest of three 
possible sentence durations for this offense is three years, the 
others being sixteen months and two years.
 
169  The prison 
priors, under section 667.5(b) of the California Penal Code 
add one year each.170  The maximum total sentence therefore 
is six years in county jail.171
 
 165. Id. at 128, 139. 
  If the court engaged in 
settlement discussions, a typical offer (before Realignment) 
would be either sixteen months or two years, with an 
 166. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 167. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 168. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 169. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11377(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(h). 
 170. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b). 
 171. The greatest possible sentence for the possession of methamphetamine 
under these circumstances is three years, plus a one-year enhancement each for 
the three prior prison sentences, equaling a total of six years. 
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assumed three years of parole.172  Since Realignment, this 
offender would be released after the sixteen months or two 
years with no tailing supervision whatsoever.173  The court 
could have split the sentence—granting eight months in 
custody and eight months on mandatory supervision—but the 
eight-month period of supervision falls short of the minimum 
of two years that Dr. Marlowe suggests is needed to address a 
defendant’s addiction.174  If the hypothetical was modified to 
have the court impose one year in custody and two on 
mandatory supervision, the defense attorney would be 
demanding that the sixteen months of straight time go into 
effect and would likely not suggest to the client to take the 
offer.175  This case would therefore, likely be at an impasse. If 
the court was dedicated to “moving cases”176, the court might 
accede to the defense request (a shorter term, but less 
beneficial to the defendant in the long run) in order to resolve 
the matter.177
The success of the Realignment Act is entwined with the 
effective use of evidence-based practices.
 
178
 
 172. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.  
  For the process of 
evidence-based practices to take full effect, the justice 
partners must consistently apply the process.  The objectives 
of Realignment will not be achieved if any link of the chain is 
broken or non-existent.  This failure will lead to an increase 
in crime and a continual spinning of the revolving door of the 
criminal justice system.  Realignment only stands a chance if 
all branches of the criminal justice system are educated in its 
objectives and supporting methodologies.  The reality that the 
 173. COUZENS, supra note 83, at 10. 
 174. Douglas Marlowe, Presentation at the Cow County Institute: Targeting 
Dispositions by Risks and Need (Jun. 20, 2012). 
 175. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 176. People v. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131, 136 (2013). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See J. RICHARD COUZENS, EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES: REDUCING 
RECIDIVISM TO INCREASE PUBLIC SAFETY: A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY COURTS 
AND PROBATION 3 (2011), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ 
EVIDENCE-BASED-PRACTICES-Summary-6-27-11.pdf. 
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State of California is no longer involved in low-level offender 
incarceration is what may force local jurisdictions and 
agencies to comply.  Since the defendants are local, 
community jurisdictions must adapt to the reality which has 
been created for them. 
IV. PLEA BARGAINING IN THE REALIGNMENT ERA 
Plea bargaining is an inextricable part of the criminal 
justice system.  The term “plea bargaining” describes a 
method of promoting settlement of cases without going 
through a trial.179  “To a large extent . . . horse trading 
[between prosecutor and defense counsel] determines who 
goes to jail and for how long.  That is what plea bargaining is.  
It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the 
criminal justice system.”180  As those involved in the system 
realize, there are bargains that determine to which counts a 
defendant is admitting culpability, and bargains which 
control the sentence to be imposed.  Plea bargains often lead 
the parties and the courts into a blurred area between the 
duties of the executive branch (to charge the defendant) and 
judiciary (to sentence the defendant).181  The central thesis of 
this section of the article is that plea bargaining, as the courts 
and attorneys have come to practice it, must be changed when 
the case involves a low-level offender in order to comply with 
evidence based practices.  Traditional plea bargaining rests 
almost exclusively on the shoulders of the attorneys, the 
court, the defendant(s), and the victims.182
 
  To implement the 
will of the Legislature in the Realignment Act, evidence based 
practices must be included at the plea bargaining stage of the 
proceedings. 
 
 179. California was one of the first states to judicially recognize the utility of 
plea bargaining, and has developed case law in support of plea bargaining, with 
limitations.  See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 604 (1970). 
 180. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). 
 181. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 182. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
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Plea bargaining is essential to the survival of the 
criminal justice system.183  Recently, scrutiny from the 
Supreme Court of the United States has generated more 
attention to the details of the plea bargaining system.184  For 
example, the Court, in two recent cases explored the 
competence of counsel required at the time of the plea 
bargaining process.185  In the cases of Missouri v. Frye and 
Lafler v. Cooper, the majority focused on the necessity of plea 
bargaining and having counsel competently performing the 
duties of a dedicated attorney actively counseling the accused 
on the correct law and the consequences of the actions 
involved in the process.186  The Court in Frye, pointed out that 
ninety-seven percent of the federal cases filed and ninety-four 
percent of all state court cases filed settle by way of pleas of 
guilty or no contest.187
In California, the statistics derived from a recent study 
by John Greacen and Fredrick Miller of ten representative 
counties, point to a similar statistic.
 
188  The study also shows 
that the decisions to enter a plea of guilty or no contest is 
made quite early in the proceedings on a felony, and often 
before a witness is even called into the courtroom.189  
According to the study, felony cases settled at or before the 
preliminary examination at a rate of over eighty percent.190
The courts in California are furthermore interested in 
and have scrutinized the plea bargaining process in terms of 
 
 
 183. See id. 
 184. See generally Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012); Frye, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1408.  
 185. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391 (holding that defendant suffered prejudice 
from counsel’s incompetent advice to reject a plea bargain); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 
1408 (holding that defense counsel’s failure to communicate the prosecutor’s 
written plea offer to defendant satisfies requirement to show ineffective 
assistance). 
 186. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407–08. 
 187. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.   
 188. JOHN GREACEN & FREDERICK MILLER, TRIAL CERTAINTY STUDY IN 
FELONY CASES, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS (2012). Available by 
mail through the Administrative Office of the Courts.  
 189. Id. at 20. 
 190. Id.  
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the role a judicial officer can play.191  In the case of People v. 
Clancey,192 the Supreme Court explored the limits of judicial 
intervention into the plea bargaining process.  In that case, 
the trial judge had given an “offer” or “indicated sentence” 
over the objection of the district attorney that included the 
dismissing of a strike prior, and a “top-bottom” of five 
years.193  Moreover, the judge took into account the fact that 
the defendant was entering an early disposition and this was 
a discounted amount of time.194  Finally, the judge promised 
that if he could not abide by the “indicated” sentence at the 
time of sentencing, the defendant would have the right to 
withdraw his plea.195
There are several limits on what a judicial officer can do 
in terms of resolution of cases.
 
196  First, the trial courts must 
be restrained in the initial discussions, and allow counsel to 
resolve the matter on their own.197  Second, the court must 
have and seek available information so that the judge will be 
making statements grounded in solid reasons.198  Third, 
courts can “indicate” a sentence that must be consistent with 
what the court would give the defendant if the case had gone 
to trial.199  Fourth, the court cannot make any inducement for 
the defendant to accept the indicated sentence.200  Finally, the 
court cannot bargain with the defendant and extend the 
opportunity to withdraw the plea if the court cannot accept 
the disposition.201
 
 
 
 191. See generally People v. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131 (2012). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 134. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 136. 
 196. See generally id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  
 197. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids judges from engaging 
in plea bargaining discussions.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c). 
 198. Clancey, 299 P.3d at 138.  See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory 
committee’s note. 
 199. Clancey, 299 P.3d at 138–39. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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As seen in Clancey, the court and the attorneys generally 
become involved in a dialogue.202  That dialogue usually takes 
the form of the court asking if any offers have been made, 
and, if so, what they are.203  In many instances that will be 
the substance of the discussion because the offer is acceptable 
and a disposition is taken.204  In more complex cases, 
discussions can go on to include counter-offers by the defense, 
interventions by the court to keep the discussions on track, 
and may even take the form of the discussions involved in 
Clancey.205  On a felony case, the central points of contention 
are usually the questions of: whether the person will be going 
to prison; if so, for what amount of time; or, if not, for how 
many months (days) in county jail.206  If a “deal” is struck, it 
is frequently memorialized in the record as a “top-bottom” 
offer of so many years in prison or months in county jail.207  
The entire process can go forward between the attorneys, and 
then, if the process is close to failing, the court can intervene 
and give an indicated sentence to a defendant who pleads 
guilty or no contest to all allegations.208  This process is called 
“pleading to the sheet” and the result is that the court will 
impose the “indicated” sentence.  The reason is that the 
executive branch has control of charging.  The judiciary has 
control of the sentencing.209  The court should not become 
involved in dismissing charges that it has not brought.210
 
  
With these broad features noted, the plea bargaining system, 
as practiced, does not support implementation of the 
Realignment Act in that ignores evidence based practices. 
 
 202. Id. at 135. 
 203. Based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 204. Based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 205. Clancey, 299 P.3d 131 at 135–36 and based on the judge-author’s 
professional experience. 
 206. Based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 207. Based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 208. See generally Clancey, 299 P.3d 131. 
 209. People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 (1970). 
 210. Id. at 94 
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First, attorneys and judges have had difficulty in shifting 
their perceptions of what the punishment is for a person 
subject to the Realignment Act.  By that, it is meant that 
under the pre-Realignment law, if a person entered a plea of 
guilty or no contest to an offense that was punishable by state 
prison, that period of time was done in prison and followed by 
parole for three years.211  Terms under the old law were 
understandable, and there was a measure of control over the 
defendant on release.212  The parole term was never 
calculated into the final equation at the plea bargaining 
session because it was going to be another agency’s issue.213  
Now, the terms under Penal Code Section 1170(h) can be a 
straight county jail sentence, or split, or blended.214  Most 
judicial officers and prosecutors think only in terms of the 
custody time.215  They are used to offering and processing 
cases on straight numbers with little regard to the 
community supervision aspects of the ultimate sentence.216  
For example, on a violation of burglary in the second degree, 
where the defendant had been to prison two times, the triad 
on the principal charge is 16 months, two years, or three 
years in state prison.217  The prison prior adds one year 
each.218  Therefore, the maximum sentence is five years  
(three for the principal, plus one year each for two prison 
priors).219
 
 211. Petersilia, Voices From the Field, supra note 44, at 39; ROBERT 
WEISBERG & LISA T. QUAN, ASSESSING JUDICIAL  SENTENCING PREFERENCES 
AFTER PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT:  A SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA JUDGES 7 
(2013), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-
centers/stanford-criminal-justice-center-scjc/california-realignment. 
  Prosecutors and judicial officers are used to 
dealing with an offer, at an early stage of the proceedings, of 
 212. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 30. 
 213. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 214. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 215. 
 215. Id. at 140–41, 157. 
 216. Id. 
 217. CAL. PENAL CODE § 461(b). 
 218. Id. § 667.5(b)(1). 
 219. Id. §§ 461(b), 667(b)(1). 
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16 months or two years.220  The problem under Realignment 
is that prosecutors and judges are still making the same type 
of offers without functionally realizing that there is no parole 
period.221  The sentence will be done locally in county jail at 
one-half time, but there is no monitoring done after that term 
is completed.222  This phenomena is illustrated by the charts 
which show a failure to utilize the “split sentence.”223
Moreover, the defense, in a situation where there was a 
straight term of county jail under Penal Code section 
1170(h)(5)(A), has no incentive to take an offer that includes a 
split or blended sentence.
 
224  An offer which contains no 
mandatory supervision under the split sentence modality is 
much more agreeable than one which does because there is no 
supervision, no probation officer to report, and no potential 
violation of the supervision.225  Further, the time that the 
defendant would do in county jail is done on a half-time basis 
due to the increase in Penal Code Section 4019.226
In short, neither side has an incentive or reason to look 
closely at the mandatory supervision model.  The failure to do 
so is a direct result of the adherence to the older method of 
plea bargaining. 
 
Second, a problem with this method of plea bargaining is 
that it completely eviscerates the sound procedure of 
evidence-based practices.  As stated before, this type of 
process would include an assessment of the defendant.  This 
assessment would be available to both sides.  This 
information would be used to assess the risk and needs of the 
defendant.  A suggested custody component would be usually 
recommended, and most importantly, the “treatment” 
component could be suggested well before the actual plea 
 
 220. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience. 
 221. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 158–59. 
 222. Id. at 155. 
 223. See supra Figure 2. 
 224. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 140–41. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 4019. 
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discussions were commenced.  Without this vital component 
being utilized at the beginning of the process, challenges to 
Realignment will be present. 
There are many obstacles present that potentially impede 
progress.227  There are also many positive influences that may 
overcome the impediments.  In some jurisdictions, probation 
officers regularly sit in on plea discussions.228  There are also 
concerns that certain Fifth Amendment rights could be 
compromised, though these can be resolved by certain 
protective orders which shield the defendant’s comments.229
Finally, the looming shadow of jail overcrowding may 
cast a pall over the entire process of plea bargaining in the 
Realignment age.
 
230  Currently, a number of county jails are 
subject to “jail caps” from federal courts.231  These caps, as 
well as self-imposed caps in the more rural counties, have 
caused a furor with the Realignment process because local 
officials, rightly or wrongly, have blamed the state for 
dumping prisoners back on to the county bed space and 
coffers without adequate funding or resources.232  The 
consequence of the “caps” with no funding is that county jails, 
in some jurisdictions are releasing sentenced prisoners 
without any supervision.233
This feature, in turn, may cause a wave of cynicism 
regarding plea bargaining in this new era.  The reason is that 
many prosecutors and judicial officers see the early release of 
  This throwing up of their hands 
causes the entire Realignment Act to be viewed with 
disrespect. 
 
 227. See generally Petersilia, Voices from the Fields, supra note 44. 
 228. For example, Santa Clara County has had probation officers regularly 
sit in on early disposition calendars for approximately 25 years. 
 229. The City and County of San Francisco Probation Department 
collaboratively developed a protective order for this type of in depth interview so 
that the results would not be admissible in court prior to sentencing.  District 
Attorney, Public Defender and Private counsel have signed off on the protocol 
implementing this process.  
 230. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 92–95, 117–18. 
 231. Id. at 134 
 232. Id. at 4. 
 233. Id. at 9. 
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sentenced prisoners as a violation of their powers, causing the 
criminal justice system to be held in disrepute.234  Therefore, 
because there is no state level option for many convicted 
felons, and the custody time must be served in a local facility, 
and that facility is full, others are released to make room for 
the newly committed or the newly committed are taken in 
and released within days.235
V. CHALLENGES OF THE REVOCATION PROCESS 
 
The revocations of post-release community supervision 
(PRCS) and mandatory supervision are often an overlooked 
area of the transition into Realignment.  Courts have never 
previously dealt with the issues presented by these 
revocations because they are new creatures of the 
Realignment Act.  The only comparative experience county 
courts have is limited to probation violation matters.  With 
the advent of two new methods of community supervision, 
new challenges emerge. 
Realignment requires the use of evidence-based practices 
for the revocation of both PRCS and mandatory 
supervision.236  When there is a technical violation of the 
release, escalating sanctions are to be utilized, such as a 
residential program for a substance abuser who has tested 
dirty, or “flash incarceration” (brief incarceration) if there was 
a failure to report to the supervision office.237  When the 
person being supervised commits a new criminal offense, 
there is a separate track for the court and probation 
department to follow and revocation may occur once the 
errant behavior is documented, in a factual manner, in a 
petition for revocation.238
 
 234. Id. at 131, 158. 
  Under the Realignment Act, once a 
violation is proven in court, the sentencing court has three 
 235. Id. at 78. 
 236. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3453, 17.5. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 39–40. 
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options to follow: 
Modify the conditions of release, including perhaps some 
additional custody time; 
Revoke supervision in its entirety and sentence the 
defendant to 180 days in county jail (In the case of mandatory 
supervision, the court maintains the right to impose the 
balance of the un-served sentence originally imposed.); or 
Refer the defendant to a re-entry court, which specializes 
in helping offenders transition back into society (“re-enter”) 
successfully while being in compliance with the terms of their 
supervision.239
The overall success of the Realignment Act is primarily 
vested with the flexibility, innovation, and dedication of the 
local probation departments.  Before the Realignment Act 
actually went into effect, most probation departments 
planned for action with strategies for handling the new 
obligations proscribed by the Act.
 
240  The obligations involved 
the convening of the Community Corrections Partnership, 
sorting out the members of this planning group, and 
implementing a plan for the local community consistent with 
the goals and objectives of the Act.241  It also meant a change 
within the probation departments because, as of October 1, 
2011, they would be responsible for the community 
supervision of those offenders who were released from 
prison.242  Heretofore, these persons were on parole and an 
obligation of the state.243  In lieu of state parole, the “nons” 
would be supervised by “High Risk Offender” units in the 
probation department.244
 
 239. Id. 
  The supervised individuals were 
 240. Id. at 196. For example, the Santa Clara County Probation Department 
assigned deputy probation officers to conference with those to be released on 
Postrelease Community Supervision in advance of their release, so that they 
would a clearer understanding of their obligations and the supervisee assessed 
to plan the program ahead of the release date, rather than after.  
 241. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(1)–(2). 
 242. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 39–40. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 201–02. 
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the non-violent, non-serious, non-registerable under Penal 
Code Section 290, and non-aggravated white-collar offenders 
who would have transitioned to release.245  They are on three-
year terms of PRCS.246
To anticipate this process, probation departments, and  
sheriff offices needed to respond methodically.  After 
garnering a statistical overview of what numbers they were to 
expect, they started to shift into the programmatic phase 
which included training probation officers to participate in 
motivational interviewing, setting up a validated assessment 
tool, and working to establish cognitive behavioral therapy.
 
247  
The sheriff offices, many of whom operate under court-
ordered caps on population, braced for the onslaught of new 
persons into their facilities.248  Generally, there were feelings 
of great trepidation about the numbers which would be 
faced.249
Against this backdrop, courts were obligated to institute 
new procedures for the revocation process.  A “hearing officer” 
needed to be designated.
 
250  New forms, with the assistance of 
the Judicial Council, were created, along with Rules of 
Court.251  New procedures within individual courts were 
established so that timely rulings could be had on 
preliminary revocations.252
 
 245. Id. at 37–39. 
  New calendars were established 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 15. 
 248. Id. at 82. 
 249. Id. at 175–78. 
 250. CAL. GOV. CODE § 71622.5. 
 251. CAL. CT. R. 4.540, & 4.541. 
 252. Revocations of parole, probation, post-release community supervision 
and mandatory supervision are controlled by California Penal Code section 
1203.2.  This section provides that the hearings should be held in a “reasonable” 
amount of time.  The concern was that the initial ruling from the federal court 
in the case of Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger,599 F. 3d 984, 995 (2010) required a 
strict timeline for the probable cause determination and the hearing dates.  In 
June 2013, Judge Karlton of the Eastern District of California dismissed the 
action because it lacked standing under the “case or controversy” requirement 
for federal jurisdiction.  The court found that the Realignment Act, and 
specifically, the provisions of California Penal Code section 1203.2 superseded 
the initial ruling he had made, which had stringent, specific deadlines for the 
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so that the violations could be monitored effectively.253 
All of the foregoing was done statewide with an eye towards 
the money available to the local jurisdictions.  Since money 
was one of the primary factors leading to the Legislative and 
gubernatorial decision-making on Realignment, and because 
the Legislature had granted local jurisdictions the pass-
through money to support the effort, the process for the 
division of funds lay in the hands of the Community 
Correctional Partnership.254  Composition of the CCP was 
dictated by statute to encompass all of the criminal justice 
partners, including the presiding judge of the local superior 
court.  Because of ethics opinions and the option included in 
the statute of having a representative of the judges act as the 
representative of the courts, most judicial officers declined to 
participate.  Court executives substituted for judicial 
participation.  Implementation of the Realignment Act, 
therefore, was designed to have fifty-eight different plans 
based on the local needs of each county.  Some counties opted 
for more jail construction.255  Others innovatively partnered 
between the sheriff’s office and local probation departments 
to create reentry centers designed to move sentenced 
prisoners into the treatment mode prior to release with 
panoply of services designed to meet individual needs based 
on results from assessments done prior to going into 
custody.256
The foregoing information is helpful in gaining a full 
understanding of the processes used for revocation of either 
PRCS or mandatory supervision.  It has become clear that the 
persons transferred under the Realignment Act are now a 
community responsibility.  The degree to which this has 
permeated local thinking is an open question. 
 
 
commencement of hearings on revocation of parole. 
 253. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 150. 
 254. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1230(b)(1)–(2). 
 255. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 164. 
 256. Id. at 197–98. 
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The first open question is the degree to which the local 
probation department is committed to the process.  Many 
probation officers seek to supplement the role of law 
enforcement officers, but also to assure compliance of the 
supervised person.257
All of these models of supervision do not bode well for the 
success of Realignment.  While the foregoing may seem 
simplistic, the judicial perception of each is valid.  The reason 
for the pessimism is that as to the person on Post-Release 
Community Supervision, they have been institutionalized and 
are coming out into a world that is markedly different that 
what they learned inside of the prison.  The supervised 
persons believed that they would have parole agents, who 
were overworked, and if they violated, they would get a 
number of months and go about their business.
  This theory of supervision often places 
the supervised person in an adversarial position with 
probation officer.  Other probation officers have adopted the 
wait-and-see approach, which gives the supervised person as 
much rope needed to hang him or her self.  The final group is 
the probation officer who is an active interventionist, who 
becomes involved in the plan of rehabilitation. 
258  The key to 
re-integrating the offender—particularly after a violation of 
release—may be judicial intervention by way of review every 
thirty, sixty, or ninety days to guarantee that the offender is 
sticking with the rehabilitative program.259
The judicial officer at the arraignment for the violation of 
post-release community supervision and mandatory 
supervision has to make critical decisions.  This readjustment 
of the sentencing process will succeed or fail based on the 
ability of the hearing officer to make critical triage decisions.  
Some of the daunting factors presented at the hearing are: 
  
 
 
 
 257. Id. at 196–98. 
 258. Id. at 9–10. 
 259. Marlowe, supra note 142, 183–201. 
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• Whether the defendant has relapsed into addict 
behavior. 
 
• Whether the defendant is suffering from a hitherto 
undisclosed mental illness, which is now florid. 
 
•Whether the defendant has continued to abuse 
substances. 
 
•Whether the defendant was committed on an offense 
that did not include gang affiliations, and now the 
defendant is with a gang. 
 
•Whether the defendant committed a technical 
violation. 
 
•Whether the defendant has a new case pending.260
 
 
Each of these scenarios presents a challenge to the 
hearing officer who must address each based on the 
background, the assessment, and prospects of the defendant. 
There are requirements which probation officers must 
meet prior to the filing of the formal petition for revocation of 
either status.  Pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 
4.541, the probation officer is required to spell out in detail 
why intermediate sanctions have failed and why the petition 
is necessary.  Preceding a petition, the probation officer might 
place a person in residential treatment for substance abuse 
offenders, and it might mean moving a defendant into a 
program of psychological therapy. 
After the petition is filed, a defendant has the full 
panoply of constitutional Due Process rights once the process 
of revocation is pursued.  Once arraigned, few choose to 
exercise those rights and go to a full hearing on the truth of 
 
 260. See CAL. CT. R. 4.541(c)(1)–(4). 
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the violation.  In many jurisdictions, the violation calendar is 
using a model similar to a drug court.261  This collaborative 
model requires that the probation officer, the district 
attorney, and the defense counsel meet with the hearing 
officer prior to the formal court hearing.262  Each defendant is 
discussed, and decisions are made in terms that are the best 
decision available at the time.263  For example, in many 
situations defendants simply abscond and are not available.  
Warrants issue and are dealt with at the next hearing after 
the time period is tolled.264
There are many instances where the decision process is 
not so simple. 
  In others, the defendant may 
have simply failed a urine test, and a higher degree of 
rehabilitation is ordered and the defendant is seeking same.  
For some, the ninety days of incarceration is not a challenge, 
and they accept it without any further penalty other than 
reinstatement of the original order of three years of release 
less the time they have done. 
First, there is the use of intermediate sanctions.  Some 
jurisdictions are requiring that if there is no new law 
violation, the probation department must utilize its best 
efforts to not file a petition and seek reasonable intermediate 
sanctions.265  A model that was picked up from the HOPE 
program in Hawaii, is “flash incarceration” (Penal Code 
Section 3455).266  Judicial intervention in this process is the 
key.267
 
 261. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 172–76 (noting the 
use of intermediate sanctions as a key feature of Realignment. This model 
requires frequent reviews and is as done in drug courts). 
  Under the California law, no court appearance or 
 262. Id. at 135. 
 263. This is based on the judge-author’s professional experience.  
 264. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a); Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra 
note 44, at 175.  
 265. Petersilia, Voices from the Field, supra note 44, at 173.  
 266. See generally ANGELA HARKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, MANAGING DRUG 
INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND CERTAIN SANCTIONS: EVALUATING 
HAWAII’S HOPE, (Dec. 2009), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/229023.pdf. 
 267. See Steve Lopez, Hawaii Finds Success with Tough-Love Approach to 
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judicial intervention is required.268
Second, there is the issue of whether intermediate 
sanctions have really been utilized.  Many of the petitions 
seen by judicial officers are bereft of creativity.  Granted, 
many offenders are completely recalcitrant; however, this Act 
was designed to compel probation officers to work with and 
manage an offender population at a local level.  The ratio of 
offender to officer has been scaled back to permit active 
intervention, yet many petitions fail to point to those kind of 
solutions to fit the offender’s issues.  For example, an offender 
with an extensive history of mental health issues fails to 
report or take a urine test.  Is a proper result a flash 
incarceration or referring the individual to services with 
strict monitoring?  Judicial officers also have a stake in this:  
if there is an intermediate sanction short of revocation, 
should not the judicial officer be involved in reviews? 
  A probation officer can 
handcuff and surrender the defendant to the jail without any 
judicial finding of any type of violation.  While this is the law, 
the wisdom of this process, on two levels, is questionable.  
This process sets up an unneeded adversarial relationship 
which is contrary to the building of a relationship which will 
foster a decline in recidivism.  The perception is that the 
probation officer is the police officer and there to incarcerate 
him/her and not to work through any issues.  Moreover, and 
leaving aside the Due Process aspects of incarceration 
without judicial intervention, the probation departments are 
missing an opportunity to have a person in a black robe 
evaluate the sanction while they remain only as a person 
providing information to the court. 
Third, the sanction to which an accused PRCS violator is 
exposed does not comport with the common sense and 
 
Repeat Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/ 
dec/01/local/la-me-1202-lopez-probation-20121202.  See also WASH. DEP’T OF 
CORR., COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PRACTICES 4–5 (2012), available at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/documents/legislature/ReportsToTheLegislature/2012%2
06204%20Report_d061929d-8b53-4158-9aa6-3db530673e22.pdf. 
 268. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3455. 
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experience of many judicial officers.  Most judicial officers are 
used to dealing with probation violations.  In that arena, if 
the accused violator is found in violation, the probation is 
revoked, and the offender is sentenced to state prison for the 
term available under the law, which may be very steep.  
There are, thus, real consequences for the violation. 
In the new era of post-Realignment law, the offender who 
violates PRCS is subject only to six months of custody time, 
done on a one-half time basis because of the new credit 
system.  For some offenders, ninety days is inconsequential; 
the defendant knows it, the defense attorney knows it, the 
court knows it, and the district attorney is too painfully 
aware of it.  This unique situation may require a small 
amount of history, which is based on anecdotal facts rather 
than hard facts. 
One aspect of the economic issues facing the State of 
California in the last years leading to Realignment was the 
amount of money the State was spending for the housing of 
persons who had violated parole.  Not only were some 
offenders returned to the prison, at the increased costs 
discussed infra, but a majority were housed in local county 
jails paid by the State per bed used.  Excluding the new law 
violations, violations may have stemmed for the simple 
failure to report to one’s supervising officer, or a dirty drug 
test.  The costs were staggering. 
In the new era, the critical feature is the challenge of 
having criminal justice personnel, judges included, adapt to 
the fact that violations will occur and the penalty is not
A final challenge in the revocation area is reserved for 
those alleged to have violated Mandatory Supervision.  In the 
initial Act, no provisions were enacted to account for the 
 that 
severe for a majority of the offenders.  The next step is 
realizing that the persistent drum beat of assessment—to 
determine the actual cause of what brings the offender into 
the system and select the best treatment program—is the key 
to both public safety and cutting recidivism. 
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revocation of Mandatory Supervision.  In clean up legislation, 
all revocation processes, including parole, which became a 
responsibility of local jurisdictions as of July 1, 2013, are 
covered by Penal Code Section 1203.2.269
CONCLUSION 
  Little, if any, 
thought has been given to the dynamics of the Mandatory 
Supervision process. One might wonder if this category is 
simply a placeholder for the inevitable conclusion that the 
court should simply grant probation, forego the prison prior 
that is available and work with the defendant as a 
probationer.  If it is not, a realistic programmatic change 
needs to be available to all of those in the system.  The 
Legislature may have to explore methods of extending the 
period of supervision in order to meet the requirement of 
Evidence Based Practices.  More thought and discussion 
among all of the justice partners is needed to overcome this 
judicial quandary. 
One key paradigm emerges from the Realignment:  local 
jurisdictions have to take responsibility, ownership, and care 
for those who are designated offenders.  No longer can 
counties transport the low level offenders to remote stretches 
of the state for a designated period of time and then, after 
that period, fail to integrate them back into society.  This 
legislation, in its long-term reach, aims at keeping the low-
level offender in the community under supervision, and to 
reintegrate the person back into a productive life through 
programs and treatment, largely geared to address substance 
abuse, addiction, and mental illness.  These key ingredients 
commonly plague low-level offenders and local programs offer 
the best resource for success, so long as there are funds and 
the proper philosophical bent.  The twin goals of public safety 
and reduction of recidivism are the hallmarks, which will be 
tested and examined both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 
 269. S.B. 1023, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
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In many respects, the success or failure of the 
Realignment Act rests not on the pronouncements of the 
bench officer, but the day-to-day work done by the justice 
partners who must deal with enforcing conditions of release, 
managing re-entry programs, and keeping a conscientious eye 
on daily bed counts in county jails.  The unique structure of 
the Realignment Act in requiring every county to have the 
Community Correction Partnership with all justice partners 
is an investment in shared goals.  The collective wisdom of 
these individuals will determine success. 
The cumulative data suggests there are some executional 
hiccups hindering Realignment’s success.  Community 
Corrections Partnerships270 in each county are supposed to 
carry out countywide Realignment strategies, but many of 
them fail to delineate specific goals271
Several affirmative solutions are apparent from 
experience and the available data. 
 that would help the 
various actors involved channel their efforts and make like-
minded decisions around evidence-based practices. 
First, judges and attorneys participating in the plea 
bargaining process on the targeted offenders must re-evaluate 
their positions in the system.  On a strict reading of Clancey, 
supra, courts are required to have as much information as 
possible before a decision is made to “indicate” a sentence.  
This is an opportunity to utilize evidence-based practices and 
obtain an assessment at the front end of the process.  It poses 
a unique opportunity to enforce the will of the Legislature 
and fashion a resolution that will be more meaningful than 
pre- Realignment sentences. 
 
 
 270. Community Correction Partnerships (CCPs) include (at least) 
representatives from the police, the sheriff, the district attorney, the public 
defender, the superior court, and social services. 
 271. Community Correction Partnership Plans, CAL. BD. OF STATE & CMTY. 
CORR., http://www.bscc.ca.gov/board/realignment-resources/community-
corrections-partnership-plans (collecting county CCP plans for fiscal years 2011 
through 2014). 
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Second, all phases of the criminal justice system must be 
educated in the background of, use of, and processes involved 
with the evidence-based practices.  While the probation 
departments and judicial branch have gone to great lengths 
to educate, continued varied forms of education, done on a 
continuous basis need to be done with those involved with law 
enforcement, jail management and, perhaps most 
importantly, the prosecutors and defense bar.  When a system 
has been operating the same way for over twenty years, any 
change is difficult.  Only through further education will this 
process become fully vested. 
Third, the entire process of mandatory supervision and 
straight time sentencing under Penal Code Sections 1170(h) 
needs to be re-examined.  The intent was to shift prison time 
back to the jails.  Credit-for-time-served formulas were done 
in an attempt to cut into the actual amount of days spent in 
jail, so that overcrowding would be a target for law suits 
locally.  Early release programs by some counties have been 
the standard.  Either the Legislature must provide for some 
period of time after the sentence on supervision, outside of 
the term in county jail, or must determine whether local 
sentences in lieu of state prison should be abolished all 
together.  In other words, the Legislature must determine 
whether they can order local courts not to send any of the low 
level offenders to prison ever.  The reasoning is simple:  to 
enforce evidence-based practices, time is needed.  The split or 
blended sentence, in most instances, provides inadequate 
time for this process to take place.  It is a hollow promise to 
both society at large and the offender in particular that 
recidivism will be reduced without this needed time.  A grant 
of probation, up to five years with a jail sentence offers much 
greater opportunity to both. 
Finally, the state must continue to financially support all 
of these efforts.  One can harken back to promise made in the 
1970’s regarding the shut down of state mental hospitals and 
the hope that local programs would do more good.  The 
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hospitals closed, but so did the state support.  This cannot 
happen when the issue of public safety is at stake.  The first 
years of Realignment disclosed the use of funds for hiring new 
jail officers, new probation officers and staffing courts.  The 
next years must be dedicated to the use of the funds for the 
programs. 
